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The Burger King Revolution: How Las Vegas 
Bounced Back, 1983–1989
David G. Schwartz
MOST WHO HAVE CONSIDERED Las Vegas historyhave concluded that not much happened in
Las Vegas gaming between the openings of the orig-
inal MGM Grand (1973) and Mirage (1989). In fact,
several structural changes during the 1980s had al-
ready reversed a declining appeal. Responding to
three crises—competition from Atlantic City, a na-
tional economic downturn, and the MGM Grand
fire—Las Vegas casino operators began to draw
more extensively on a middle-class mass market.
Capitalizing on the “Burger King Revolution,” Strip
casinos drew more gamblers who, on average,
played less, and slot machines displaced table games
as the industry’s leading revenue producer. This suc-
cessful strategy broadened the city’s visitor pool and
created a base for later expansion. 
With a 5% national revenue decline in 2008, the
bloom finally came off the casino industry rose.1
For nearly 30 years, the gaming industry had been
touted as “recession-proof.” But, as the economic
downturn intensified and the national gambling
spend declined, it became clear that consumer de-
mand for casino gambling was indeed sensitive to
larger economic fluctuations. In Las Vegas, the
drop-off in both visitor arrivals and gaming revenue
was heralded as particularly surprising. Though the
city had faced adversity as recently as 2001–2003,
this was seen as an unprecedented decline that au-
gured a grim, uncertain future. 
The 2008 downturn, however, was not excep-
tional. In the early 1980s, the city suffered the triple-
whammy of competition from Atlantic City, the
1978–1982 national economic downturn, and the
MGM Grand fire, which was a both a tragedy and
major public relations nightmare for the city’s
newest, largest resort. Some thought that Las Vegas
had seen its best days. But after three years of de-
cline, the tide turned, as casino operators began to
draw more extensively on a demographic segment
described as “low roller” and “middle market.” De-
scribed as the “Burger King Revolution,” this shift
allowed Las Vegas casinos to benefit from mass
marketing and a larger pool of potential visitors.
Though the new guests spent, on average, less than
the old, there were more of them, and with their pa-
tronage Las Vegas quickly recovered. Yet the very
success of the Burger King Revolution set into mo-
tion a reaction: the perception that Las Vegas was
neglecting the upper end of the market paved the
way for the Mirage era of massive, luxury-oriented
casino resorts, which came to dominate the Strip in
the 1990s and after. As a result, in 2009, many long-
time Las Vegas visitors lamented that there were
few options for “traditional” budget travelers. 
Existing histories of Las Vegas and gambling
largely neglect the 1980s; it is a lost decade, sand-
wiched between the corporate advance of the 1970s
and the mega-resort era of the 1990s. The appearance
of the Mirage in 1989, with supernova-like luminos-
ity, has blinded most subsequent writers to the deep
changes that took place in the previous decade.
Awash in a sea of schmaltz, Las Vegas only moved
ahead, most say, by reinventing itself as an upscale
vacation destination that just happened to have gam-
bling. Without the new paradigm presented by the
opening of the Mirage, Las Vegas may have contin-
ued its supposed decline. Eugene Moehring devotes
an epilogue in the second edition of his Las Vegas
1 STATE OF THE STATES 2009: THE AGA SURVEY OF CASINO EN-
TERTAINMENT 2 (2009).
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history Resort City in the Sunbelt to the changes in
Las Vegas from 1970 to 2000. In it, he mentions some
of the trends sparked by the Burger King Revolution,
such as RV parks on the Strip, but does not devote
any attention to the crisis that sparked the phenome-
non. In fact, he located the shift towards a family-
friendly marketing approach in the 1990s, declaring
that, “even though casino executives realize that high
rollers and upper- and middle-income gamblers will
always be the town’s preferred clientele, Las Vegas
in the 1990s marketed itself as a family vacation cen-
ter.”2 Though he acknowledges that casinos had made
efforts to cater to families in earlier years, he misses
the significance of the early-1980s trauma or the re-
action to it.
Geoff Schumacher, in his Sun, Sin, and Subur-
bia: An Essential History of Modern Las Vegas, ac-
knowledges the shock of the early-1980s recession,
but considers it to have been erased only by the
opening of the Mirage in 1989 and the building
boom that followed.3 Schumacher largely follows
William Thompson’s analysis from a chapter of The
Maverick Spirit: Building the New Nevada. There,
Thompson describes how “massive shock waves
rippled through a stunned Nevada political and eco-
nomic leadership” after the crises of the 1980s, stat-
ing that “the future looked problematical at best.”
Rather than searching for the institutional reactions
to such a cataclysm, however, Thompson finds a
simple, millennial transformation as “a single man
emerged who provided the charismatic leadership
that led to a stunning turnaround of Las Vegas’ for-
tunes.”4 That man was Steve Wynn, whose Mirage
hotel’s debut was certainly a watershed moment, but
nevertheless one that followed—and was made pos-
sible by—the success of operators reversing a de-
cline several years earlier.
Hal Rothman, in Neon Metropolis: How Las Ve-
gas Started the Twenty-First Century, gives Wynn
an equally epochal role. “The city’s lowest point
came in the 1980s,” he writes, “before Wynn con-
ceived of the Mirage. The corporations had plenty
of cash, but they lacked verve and flair. They
weren’t entertainers and they felt uncomfortable
with the excess and eccentricities built into the fab-
ric of gaming.”5 Rothman may be right from an aes-
thetic point of view, but without the restructuring of
the mid-1980s, it is unlikely that the gaming indus-
try in Las Vegas would have been financially
healthy enough to attract the investment capital
needed to build the Mirage.
In an analysis more tightly focused on the casino
industry, Suburban Xanadu: The Casino Resort on
the Las Vegas Strip and Beyond, the current is sim-
ilarly pre-occupied with explaining the transforma-
tion of the Strip in the 1990s along theme-park lines,
though he acknowledges that “the idea that Las Ve-
gas was on the verge of becoming a full-fledged
family resort was a minor trope in the city’s pro-
motional literature since the early 1950s.”6 But in
neglecting the changes that preceded the 1990s hy-
per-theming, the author’s vision is obscured, at least
in part, by the same resort-building excesses that
“have mesmerized architectural critics and casual
tourists alike, often to the detriment of good analy-
sis.”7
The lone historian to capture Las Vegas post-re-
cession but pre-Mirage, John Findlay, acknowl-
edged the importance of the early-1980s slowdown
and correctly assessed the industry’s counter-stroke.
In People of Chance, his 1986 survey of American
gambling “from Jamestown to Las Vegas,” Findlay,
writing in the midst of the Burger King Revolution,
noted that “the financial troubles faced by several
hotels and casinos” in the wake of declining visita-
tion “suggested that Las Vegans needed to come to
terms with the reality of slower growth.” Broaden-
ing the city’s appeal by adding family attractions,
Findlay wrote, “indicated that the community was
responding to the new conditions.”8
“IF THEY THINK IT’S A DEVASTATED
AREA NOW . . . ”
New Jersey voters approved casino gambling for
Atlantic City in 1976, and the first dice rolled in
1978. In its first half-year of operation, a lone
casino, Resorts International, earned more than
SCHWARTZ262
2 EUGENE MOEHRING, RESORT CITY IN THE SUNBELT: LAS VE-
GAS 1930–2000, 271 (2000).
3 GEOFF SCHUMACHER, SUN, SIN, AND SUBURBIA: AN ESSENTIAL
HISTORY OF MODERN LAS VEGAS 74–7 (2004).
4 Bill Thompson, Steve Wynn: “I Got the Message,” in THE
MAVERICK SPIRIT: BUILDING THE NEW NEVADA 196 (Richard O.
Davies, ed., 1999).
5 HAL ROTHMAN, NEON METROPOLIS: HOW LAS VEGAS STARTED
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 29 (2002).
6 DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, SUBURBAN XANADU: THE CASINO RE-
SORT ON THE LAS VEGAS STRIP AND BEYOND 202 (2003).
7 Id.
8 JOHN FINDLAY, PEOPLE OF CHANCE: GAMBLING IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY FROM JAMESTOWN TO LAS VEGAS 204 (1986).
$134 million in revenues.9 This vindicated Resorts
chairman James Crosby, who boasted before the
casino even opened that it would out-earn the MGM
Grand, one of Las Vegas’ most profitable casinos,
which made about $100 million annually.10 Despite
its nearly fifty-year head start as a casino monop-
oly, Nevada was suddenly challenged by a power-
ful upstart.
Atlantic City casino revenues continued to soar
despite a dire national economy. In 1979, the city’s
casinos won more than $324 million, and in the fol-
lowing year nearly doubled their revenue to just un-
der $650 million. By 1982, annual revenues ap-
proached $1.5 billion, and in 1985, with eleven
casinos, the rapidly-maturing gaming industry broke
the $2 billion mark.11
Las Vegas casino revenues grew much more
slowly. In 1985, Atlantic City’s landmark year, the
Las Vegas Strip’s 38 major locations boasted under
$2.3 billion in revenues, up barely more than $100
million from the year before. Atlantic City, with less
than a third of the Strip’s casinos, was within shout-
ing distance of Las Vegas’ crown as the world’s top
casino destination.12 Atlantic City, nearly everyone
agreed, was the city of the future.
The alarming success of Atlantic City sparked
anxiety in Las Vegas. More than 3,000 new high-
end hotel rooms had just come online in the desert
resort, and it now seemed that gambling junkets and
conventions from the East Coast might not be com-
ing to the party in Las Vegas, but instead might
play closer to home.13 Gamblers were certainly ar-
riving in the seaside city en masse. As early as
1983, only five years after the birth of the industry
there, over 26 million visitors enjoyed the new
casino experience of Atlantic City—more than dou-
ble the 12.3 million that flew or drove to Las Ve-
gas.14
Even before the first Atlantic City casinos
opened, it was clear that the town would bring an
unwonted competition to the casino game. “New
Jersey, which envisions glamour and glitter return-
ing to the depressed boardwalk town, is the first state
to intrude on Nevada’s gambling monopoly,” the
Las Vegas Sun announced in an above-the-fold story
the day after New Jersey voters approved casino
gambling in 1976.15 Las Vegas news outlets gener-
ally gave coverage of Atlantic City a negative slant,
betraying an underlying apprehension about the po-
tential rival. 
Though the industry’s leaders maintained poker
faces—Gaming Control Board chairman Phillip
Hannifin boasted that he couldn’t see how Atlantic
City would catch up with Las Vegas or appreciably
cut into its East Coast customer base—there was an
undercurrent of anxiety amid the show of opti-
mism.16 As Resorts’ opening approached, the knives
came out. Las Vegas Sun publisher Hank Green-
spun, in an appearance on NBC’s Today show hours
before the casino opened, warned the organized
crime would “fleece” the city. “If they think it’s a
devastated area now . . . just wait until those sharpies
get through with it.”17 This was a curious threat
from one of the strongest boosters of Las Vegas, a
city with more than its share of organized crime
scandals, including several that were still unfolding.
The next week, a front page Sun article announced
that gambling in Atlantic City just wasn’t as fun as
in Las Vegas: blackjack was saddled with cumber-
some rules, like not allowing aces to be split, and
craps was played at “an almost incredibly slow
pace.” The author even complained that counting
cards was harder in Atlantic City, although Las Ve-
gas casinos had long employed anti-card-counting
measures.18 While they professed to be unafraid,
those with a stake in Nevada gaming protested too
much to be entirely relaxed.
Even operators who gave Atlantic City long odds
worried about the end result of competition. “God
love ‘em, let ‘em have it,” casino owner Michael
Gaughan told the Valley Times after the momentous
election. “They’ll find out it’s not as easy as it looks.
I don’t welcome it and I don’t fear it. . . . [but] it
might open a Pandora’s box, lead to gaming in other
places that could hurt us more.”19 Atlantic City, Las
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Vegans agreed, might yet prove a loser; but the idea
of competition would probably prove a winner in
the long run. That was not good news for a state
that had built its reputation around a national mo-
nopoly on legal casino gaming, and it augured
poorly for Las Vegas’ future prospects.
“NOT AN ISLAND UNTO ITSELF”
Atlantic City was only one of the bugbears threat-
ening Las Vegas. As formidable foe as the eastern
resort might be, Las Vegas faced an even deadlier
enemy within: its own susceptibility to a weaken-
ing national economy. Though the 1970s were not
a period of national economic growth, early in the
decade Las Vegas gaming revenues seemed to defy
the generally dismal economic outlook, posting dou-
ble-digit gains from 1972 to 1975 (Table 1). When
adjusted for inflation, these increases are not as im-
pressive, particularly in 1974–1975, but they still
represent real gains in revenue during times of wide-
spread economic hardship and uncertainty. By the
Carter years, however, the situation had changed.
The economic crunch then unfolding, during which
the nation charted its decline via the misery index,
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TABLE 1. CLARK COUNTY ANNUAL GAMING REVENUES VS. AVERAGE ANNUAL INFLATION, 1970–2009
Year Gaming Revenues % Increase Inflation Adj. % Increase
1970 $369,286,977 — 5.8% —
1971 $399,410,972 8.1% 4.3% 3.8%
1972 $476,126,720 19.2% 3.3% 15.9%
1973 $588,221,779 23.5% 6.2% 17.3%
1974 $684,714,502 16.4% 11.0% 5.4%
1975 $770,336,695 12.5% 9.2% 3.3%
1976 $845,975,652 9.8% 5.8% 4.0%
1977 $1,015,463,342 20.0% 6.5% 13.5%
1978 $1,236,235,456 21.7% 7.6% 14.1%
1979 $1,423,620,102 15.2% 11.6% 3.6%
1980 $1,617,194,799 13.6% 13.6% 0.0%
1981 $1,676,148,606 3.6% 10.4% 6.8%
1982 $1,751,421,394 4.5% 6.2% 1.7%
1983 $1,887,451,717 7.8% 3.2% 4.6%
1984 $2,008,155,460 6.4% 4.3% 2.1%
1985 $2,256,762,736 12.4% 3.6% 8.8%
1986 $2,431,237,168 7.7% 1.9% 5.8%
1987 $2,789,336,000 14.7% 3.7% 11.0%
1988 $3,136,901,000 12.5% 4.1% 8.4%
1989 $3,430,851,000 9.4% 4.8% 4.6%
1990 $4,104,001,000 19.6% 5.4% 14.2%
1991 $4,152,407,000 1.2% 4.3% 3.1%
1992 $4,381,710,000 5.5% 3.0% 2.5%
1993 $4,727,424,000 7.9% 3.0% 4.9%
1994 $5,430,651,000 14.9% 2.6% 12.3%
1995 $5,717,567,000 5.3% 2.8% 2.5%
1996 $5,783,735,000 1.2% 2.9% 1.7%
1997 $6,152,415,000 6.4% 2.3% 4.1%
1998 $6,346,985,000 3.2% 1.6% 1.6%
1999 $7,210,700,000 13.6% 2.2% 11.4%
2000 $7,671,252,000 6.4% 3.4% 3.0%
2001 $7,636,547,000 0.5% 2.8% 3.3%
2002 $7,630,562,000 .01% 1.6% 1.7%
2003 $7,830,856,000 2.6% 2.3% 0.3%
2004 $8,711,426,000 11.2% 2.7% 8.5%
2005 $9,717,322,000 11.6% 3.4% 8.2%
2006 $10,630,387,000 9.4% 3.2% 6.2%
2007 $10,868,464,000 2.2% 2.9% 0.7%
2008 $9,796,970,000 9.9% 3.9% 13.8%
2009 $8,833,902,000 9.8% 0.3 9.5%
Sources: Las Vegas Visitors and Convention Authority, Historical Las Vegas Visitor Statistics, LVCVA.com,
2008. Las Vegas Visitors and Convention Authority, 2009 Year-End Summary; <http://www.inflationdata.com/
inflation/Inflation_Rate/HistoricalInflation.aspx>.
a combination of inflation and unemployment,
reached its peak in 1980, though the adverse effects
would sap Las Vegas’ gaming economy for years. 
The affluence of the early 1970s, however,
birthed a truism that is disproven anew in every gen-
eration only to rise again: that Las Vegas itself and
casino gaming more broadly are “recession-proof.”
This assertion has more lives than a cat, which might
be amusing were it not taken seriously enough to
impact public policy. 
In 2008, several media outlets reported with great
surprise that Las Vegas was not recession-proof.
“For decades,” the New York Times reported in May
of that year, “this gambling center seemed nearly
immune to the economic swings of the rest of the
country. But these days, the city built on excess is
seeing a troubling sign: moderation. Gambling rev-
enue and hotel occupancy are down. Resorts are
slashing room rates and offering coupons or free
nights.”20 This article cited several recent trends, in-
cluding the growing reliance on non-gaming rev-
enues and smaller-scale spenders more sensitive 
to fluctuations in their discretionary income. “Las
Vegas is now as vulnerable as other communities,”
J. Terrance Lanni, chairman of the board of casino
giant MGM Mirage declared.21
This was received as inspired, new wisdom, but
it had been heard before. Less than seven years ear-
lier, a reporter with the Las Vegas Sun had made a
similar discovery. “During Las Vegas’ boom of the
1990s, the Strip hotel-casino industry was often
called recession-proof,” David Strow wrote in a Sept.
20, 2001 article on a wave of layoffs that followed
the contraction of tourism in the wake of the Sept.
11 terrorist attacks. “No one is saying that now.”22
Yet even this was nothing new. During the 1990–
1992 recession, experts expressed a similar sense of
novelty that Nevada gaming was not immune to
larger economic slowdowns. Noting that the state
had had a “long history of virtually unbroken year-
to-year increases,” economist Bill Eadington never-
theless found that, “there’s been a very noticeable
shift in attitude, towards pessimism,” among casino
operators. Mirage Resorts spokesman Alan Feldman
concurred: “It is pretty clear the recession is finally
catching up with Las Vegas.”23
This was treated, again, as big news, but econo-
mist Thomas Cargill had debunked the idea of Las
Vegas as a recession-proof haven as early as 1979.
In a paper for the University of Nevada Reno’s Bu-
reau of Business and Economic Research, he argued
that Nevada was not “an island unto itself,” but was
profoundly influenced by regional, national, and
global economic events.24 Since a significant num-
ber of Nevada tourists came from California, drops
in employment, income, and economic well-being
in that state naturally would adversely impact
Nevada.
Revenue numbers from Clark County’s gaming
industry bear out Cargill’s assertion. In 1978, the
area’s gross gaming win rose more than 21%,
though adjusting for inflation gives the less im-
pressive but still substantial increase of about 14%.
The following year, runaway inflation ate up nearly
all of the revenue gain—the effective increase was
only 3.6%, close to the decade’s previous low,
1975’s 3.3% (Table 1).25
In 1980, the inflation rate almost exactly matched
the increase in gaming revenue so that the gaming
industry essentially was stagnant. The next year, ac-
counting again for inflation, Clark County gaming
revenues declined by almost 7%, an unprecedented
drop. Rising fuel costs and gas shortages had se-
verely cut into the drive-in market, and the dismal
national economy and a dampening market for air
travel similarly restricted traffic at McCarran Inter-
national Airport—from a high of about 10.6 million
passengers in 1979, visitor totals dropped slightly
in 1980 and more dramatically in the next two years.
In 1981 and 1982, less than 9.5 million passengers
used McCarran airport.26
Gaming revenues in the early 1980s reflected this
malaise. Following the nearly 7% drop (adjusted for
inflation) in 1981, gaming win for Clark County
shrank nearly 2% in 1982. In that year, hotel occu-
pancy rates dropped to 76%, the lowest rate since
1971, and the first dip into the seventies since that
year.27
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As stark a picture as these numbers paint, they
may actually minimize the nature of the revenue
slowdown. Casino managers had routinely skimmed
(diverted to hidden interests) an incalculable amount
of money since the Las Vegas casino industry’s in-
ception. The official casino take was therefore un-
der-reported, so the revenue numbers were lower
than they should have been from the 1950s forward.
During the 1970s and early 1980s, as the last ves-
tiges of underworld influence disappeared, the re-
ported casino win came gradually into line with the
real casino win. Clark County gaming revenues rose
by more than 200% in the years 1970 to 1978, while
the visitor volume expanded by only 65%; even ac-
counting for inflation, that was asking gamblers to
spend far more, per capita, than they had previously.
It’s possible, then, that not all of the increase of the
1970s represented a legitimate rise in business but
rather a harmonization of the actual and reported
revenues.28
A decline in the overall number of visitors to
Las Vegas supports the contention that Las Vegas
faced a serious crisis in the early 1980s. In 1970,
nearly 6.8 million visitors a year came to Las Ve-
gas and its environs. Eight years later, the total
stood at 11.1 million. But from 1978 to 1980 this
remarkable growth slowed—only 11.9 million
came to Las Vegas in 1980, a growth of less than
800,000 in three years. Over the next two years,
visitor volume declined, slipping to 11.6 million in
1982. 29
Events far from Nevada conspired to rob Las Ve-
gas of several of its most valued customers. Start-
ing in the 1970s, several casinos had marketed to
Mexican high rollers. In 1982, when the peso was
dramatically devalued, most of these customers
could no longer afford trips to Las Vegas. Worse
yet, they were unable to pay off their gambling debts
with their devalued currency, leaving Las Vegas
casinos with millions of dollars in uncollectable bad
debts: from 1980 to 1983, the percentage of casino
revenues written off as bad debts on the Strip more
than doubled, rising from 4.4% to 9.3% (Table 2).30
Similar difficulties in Hong Kong and the Middle
East kept big spenders from those locales home as
well. With Atlantic City siphoning off a significant
portion of the East Coast market and their estab-
lished inroads abroad eroded, Las Vegas casino op-
erators were justly pessimistic.31
“LIFE SEEMED TO HAVE SWITCHED
INTO NEUTRAL”
Yet Las Vegas faced more than just increased
competition and a dismal national economy. It also
confronted a crisis of confidence and a shattered
public image due to a massive, entirely preventable,
tragedy.
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TABLE 2. REVENUE FROM SLOTS VS. TABLES, LAS VEGAS STRIP, FISCAL 1980–1989
Year Pit Slots Other Bad Debts
1980 65.4% 32.3% 2.3% 4.4%
1981 64.3% 32.7% 3.0% 5.1%
1982 63.2% 34.0% 5.0% 8.2%
1983 57.0% 40.0% 3.0% 9.3%
1984 54.9% 41.5% 3.6% 3.5%
1985 54.6% 41.3% 4.1% 3.1%
1986 52.2% 43.0% 4.7% 2.6%
1987 50.5% 44.8% 4.7% 2.4%
1988 49.4% 45.5% 5.1% 2.4%
1989 49.3% 45.7% 5.0% 2.6%
Notes: All casinos with gaming revenue of $1,000,000 and over.
“Pit” income includes keno and bingo.
“Other” includes race book, sports pool, poker, and pan.
“Bad Debts” is the bad debt expense incurred by the casino department, represented as a per-
centage of total gaming revenue. 
Source: NEVADA GAMING ABSTRACTS, 1980–1989.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Iver Peterson, While Atlantic City Rolls On, Las Vegas Comes
Up Losing, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 21, 1984, at E2.
31 Vegas revival wears a blue collar, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec.
5, 1985.
On Nov. 21, 1980, a deadly fire ripped through
the MGM Grand Hotel Casino, then Las Vegas’
newest and most modern resort. Eighty-seven peo-
ple died, and video footage of black smoke billow-
ing from the casino entrance—and trapped guests in
the hotel towers frantic for rescue—aired on news-
casts around the nation. The fire, which was made
far worse by the casino’s failure to install sprinklers,
was a public relations nightmare for Las Vegas. If
guests couldn’t be safe in this ultra-modern palace,
could they feel comfortable in any Las Vegas ho-
tel? Las Vegas was a tourist town built on a certain
insouciance and escape from care, and the specter
of death—the ultimate reality—understandably re-
duced its appeal for revelers.
There was more bad news to come. Four months
later, a fire at the Las Vegas Hilton—which killed
eight people, injured two hundred, and left black-
ened scorch marks along the tower’s façade—com-
pounded the fiasco.32 Retro-fitting the massive casi-
nos of the Strip to mitigate such blazes would be
costly, time-consuming, and would make far less
impression on the public than the tragic fires. Even
if the hotels of Las Vegas were to have perfect safety
records for the next five years, millions of potential
visitors would not forget the images of fire, death,
and destruction, and many of them would decide to
vacation elsewhere.
In the early 1980s, then, Las Vegas seemed down
on its luck. The MGM Grand fire symbolized a
larger loss of confidence in the city’s future. With
decreasing revenues, increasing competition, and a
hotel inventory now viewed as unsafe, the smart
money was against the house. In a 1982 Boston
Globe Magazine article, Connie Page summed up
the mood in Las Vegas. In contrast to previous trips
to the Strip, when guests freed themselves from their
usual restraints, “this year’s visit . . . was different.
Life seemed to have switched into neutral. Snatches
of conversation with some of the army of casino
workers . . . soon made the difference clear: local
unemployment was higher than ever before, busi-
ness was off, the prospects for recovery uncertain.
The people of Las Vegas, ordinarily carefree, were
worried about the future. In short, Las Vegas was
in the throes of the Great Recession of 1982.”33
Behind the tables, the gloom was even more in-
tense. A “recession impact survey” conducted by ac-
counting firm Laventhol and Horwath in 1980 re-
vealed that most respondents felt that the recession
had hurt their business. The high-end properties on
the Strip felt the pinch far more acutely than the
value-oriented downtown hotels because, as one re-
spondent put it, “there are a lot more ‘ordinary peo-
ple’ in this world than high rollers.” Though most
Nevada respondents insisted that the gaming indus-
try still had long-term growth potential, few denied
that the state was in a bad position. By contrast, At-
lantic City’s managers reported that they did not feel
any decline in business at all.34
But the city’s casino operators did not give up or
passively wait for business conditions to improve.
Rather, they reconsidered their operations and de-
vised a new formula for attracting visitors that they
believed would help them adapt to the new chal-
lenges of the 1980s.
“A DIFFERENT KIND OF TRADE”
The 1980 Laventhol and Horvath survey revealed
one of the most troubling lessons of the on-going
downturn: that the luxury hotels of the Strip were
more sensitive to economic fluctuations than the
low-roller gambling halls of downtown. The smart
money had always said that high rollers were the
bread and butter of any first-class casino resort.
Now, however, they were staying away. 
The recession and the growth of Atlantic City
sparked what was called the “Burger King Revolu-
tion:” an embrace of middle-class vacationers, bus
tourists, and families in campers on the Las Vegas
Strip.35 This was the only way, a variety of industry
leaders believed, that Las Vegas could remain viable
and continue to grow. The exclusive approach might
have worked in the past, but the city had crossed a
threshold and now had to market itself to a broader
audience. Thus, Rossi Ralenkotter, director of tourism
and research for the Las Vegas Visitors and Conven-
tion Authority, said in 1984 that “Now we are into
mass marketing. When you’ve got 53,000 hotel rooms
to fill, you’d better appeal to everyone.”36
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The Revolution transformed Strip casinos, but not
entirely beyond recognition. Most would keep their
baccarat pits tucked off to the back, but they
wouldn’t be adding many more suites. Instead, slot
machines, fast food restaurants, and RV parks would
attract customers and discount coupons would be-
come the coin of the realm. An $800 million ex-
pansion of McCarran airport would help speed the
arrival of the masses, and a $10 million advertising
campaign would let them know that Las Vegas was
welcoming new customers.37
The “Burger King Revolution” was not just a turn
of phrase: this epochal upheaval centered on an ac-
tual Burger King franchise serving Whoppers and
Croissan’Whiches on the Las Vegas Strip. Attorney
and certified public accountant Jeffrey Silver, who
had earned a reputation as “the Red Adair of Las
Vegas” by putting out a proverbial fire and revers-
ing the fortunes of the oft-troubled Landmark casino
hotel, brought fast food to the Riviera in 1984 as
part of his strategy to revive that troubled Strip land-
mark.38 The Riviera had spent decades chasing high
rollers only to end up in Chapter 11 bankruptcy
while across the street Circus Circus chased low-ac-
tion players and thrived. Once put in charge of the
Riviera, Silver immediately began building an ex-
pansion that would house 500 new slot machines, a
video game arcade, and a Burger King—the first
fast-food franchise in a Strip casino.39
The move to the masses was not without contro-
versy. Several Riviera executives opposed Silver’s
Burger King idea, arguing that it would cheapen the
hotel. But Silver argued, quite logically, that fast
food would be his casino’s salvation. Directly across
the street, a McDonald’s did “land office business”
even though it was in the shadow of the Circus Cir-
cus marquee, which advertised a $2.49 lunch buf-
fet. McDonald’s was inexpensive, but couldn’t
come close to meeting the price/volume quotient of
the Circus Circus buffet. Silver concluded that the
McDonald’s thrived because a significant portion of
the Strip’s clientele was either uneasy about the
quality of food in the casinos or simply liked the se-
curity of a familiar setting on their vacation.40 Even
those who opposed the Burger King saw Silver’s
logic, and the project went forward.
Outside the casino, the opposition was even
stronger. The Clark County Planning Commission
refused to approve his proposal to erect a Burger
King sign outside the hotel, deeming its addition a
detriment to the character of the Strip. But, Silver
insisted, it was a matter of changing with the times.
Only by pursuing a previously-neglected market, he
argued, could Las Vegas meet its latest challenger:  
This new appeal to the middle class won’t hurt
Las Vegas at all. This is a fast-food genera-
tion, and someday you’re liable to see a Burger
King at Caesars Palace, too. Atlantic City has
staked out a territory. It’s a gambling town.
But if you want to gamble and vacation, you
come to Las Vegas. No one vacations in New
Jersey.41
Ultimately, Silver won. The Burger King opened a
few months later, and was for a long time the most
successful franchise in the chain. Other casino op-
erators, who had initially opposed Silver, began
sniffing out franchise opportunities of their own.42
The Riviera’s new eatery did more than prosper;
it drove customers to the hotel and gave the casino
a safe, friendly image. “We’ve changed the focus of
the hotel,” Riviera president Arthur Waltzman pro-
claimed triumphantly in late 1985. “We’re targeting
Middle America.”43 Silver’s vision of a Burger King
Revolution on the Strip came to pass: fast-food
restaurants now appear inside many Strip hotels, and
the Riviera’s food court came to include a variety
of options, from Pizza Hut to Quizno’s subs, in-
cluding the original Burger King.44
Visitors to town in 1984 encountered several
signs of the new order. Checking in for flights, they
received for the first time booklets filled with
coupons known as funbooks.45 Invented by down-
town Las Vegas pioneer Jackie Gaughan, these
coupons offered tourists a multitude of small val-
ues: a half-price dinner, a free pull on a slot ma-
chine, a matching bet on a blackjack table. Gaughan
had been using them to lure patrons to his no-frills
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downtown gambling halls for years, but now they
were ubiquitous on the formerly proud Strip.46
Passed out with room keys, at restaurants, and with
ticket purchases, they tempted the thrifty into casi-
nos that, five years earlier, would have given them
the cold shoulder.47
Silver’s Burger King was revolutionary, but he
was right to seize the moment and unabashedly take
a fast-food approach. Already, outside observers no-
ticed a change in the tenor of the desert resort. “Ve-
gas has changed,” the New York Times concluded
in 1984. “It’s looking for new customers as it tries
to adjust to new competition, a different kind of
trade, and new technologies.”48
This included re-evaluating the city’s target cus-
tomers. In 1985, Mint Casino Hotel general man-
ager Marv Leavitt admitted that previously the “high
roller” betting big on table games was the “premier
gambler” of Las Vegas. But that was changing.
“Now we’ve recognized that the dollar slot player
can be worth more than a $5 table player.”49 Quar-
ter-slot players also proved a valuable market seg-
ment; quarter-slot machine inventory on the Strip
more than doubled from 1983 to 1989, rising from
9, 131 to 20,499. By 1987, more than half of the
slot machines on the Strip were quarter machines
(Table 3).50 The humble quarter slot was suddenly
driving the growth of the Las Vegas Strip.
Leavitt’s championing of the slot player was em-
blematic of the Burger King Revolution’s impact on
the casino floor. The new focus on low rollers
speeded the dominance of slot machines. Jay Sarno,
with Circus Circus, was a pioneer in promoting the
slot machine as a major part of the casino revenue
picture. He consciously designed this casino, which
opened in 1968, to feature slot machines as an im-
portant part of the casino floor. Slots-only parlors
were already common, but this was the first attempt
by a major Strip property to court the slot cus-
tomer.51 After assuming management of the casino
in 1974, Bill Bennett and Bill Pennington aban-
doned Sarno’s attempts to attract high rollers and
eliminated many of his ancillary and competing at-
tractions, honing a business model that centered on
middle-market, slots-playing visitors. They soon
turned profits that belied the modest bankrolls of
their customers, drawing more than two-thirds of
their business from repeat customers, who cumula-
tively gambled a great deal more than occasional
high rollers.52
Nevertheless, other operators were slow to aban-
don their traditional reliance on table games. In
1971, Las Vegas Strip casinos earned less than 19%
of their total gaming revenues from slot machines.53
Three years later, the total fell slightly to just over
18%.54 In 1977, however, the slot percentage began
to climb; from 23% in that year, it rose to 30% in
1979.55 By 1983, Strip casinos were earning 40%
of their gaming revenues from slots—more than
doubling the devices’ share in less than a decade
(Table 2).56
Yet more was to come. From 1983 to 1989, in-
clusive, the Strip’s installed slot base grew from
22,354 to 36,509, a 63% increase. In the same pe-
riod, the installed table base grew from 1,287 to
VEGAS BOUNCED BACK 269
TABLE 3. LAS VEGAS STRIP SLOT MIX, 1983–1989
Year 5¢ 10¢ 25¢ 50¢ Dollar Other Total Slots
1983 6,920 391 9,131 194 5,052 666 22,354
1984 6,416 258 10,947 181 5,091 693 23,586
1985 6,505 258 12,365 200 5,463 834 25,625
1986 6,321 314 13,213 260 5,661 833 26,602
1987 5,965 342 15,515 290 6,436 853 29,411
1988 5,560 271 15,814 317 6,825 526 29,313
1989 6,111 219 20,499 392 8,541 747 36,509
Note: Casinos with annual gross gaming revenue of more than $1,000,000 in previous year.
Source: Nevada State Gaming Control Board Gaming Revenue Analysis, for final month or quarter in calendar year.
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1,575—a 22% increase.57 Assuming a multiplier of
6 to find the total number of gaming positions per
table, in 1983 table games represented nearly 26%
of the total gaming positions on the Las Vegas Strip.
By 1989, they had less than 21% of the total (Ta-
bles 3, 4).58
In turning to slots, the Strip began to converge
with downtown Las Vegas, which had weathered
the recession comparatively better than the Strip. In
1980, Strip casinos derived more than 65% of their
income from the table games of the pit, chiefly
blackjack, craps, roulette, and baccarat. That per-
centage steadily fell, until in 1988, for the first time,
Strip casinos got less than half of their gross rev-
enue from table games (Tables 2, 5).59 Even in high-
end casinos, slot machines were becoming more im-
portant. In 1975, a blackjack or craps table was
likely a casino’s most important piece of gambling
equipment. Ten years later, it was a quarter slot ma-
chine.
“GAMING IS GROWING AGAIN”
Just as Circus Circus had been ahead of the curve
in seizing on the primacy of slot machines, it was
also one of the first casinos to thrive in the “new
Las Vegas” of the 1980s. The casino decided to stop
extending credit to players, forgoing $10,000-a-trip
high rollers entirely for families whose total annual
income was less than $45,000.60 The casino had no
baccarat tables, a clear signal that big spenders were
not welcome.61 By charging between $16 and $36
for a room night, the casino’s managers ensured that
it would always have plenty of supplicants at the
quarter slots. Its buffet was emblematic of the Cir-
cus Circus approach: with an all-you-can-eat break-
fast at $1.99, lunch at $2.49, and dinner at a mind-
boggling $3.49, the eatery was a bona fide loss
leader. Yet, as then-analyst (and today CEO of Pin-
nacle Gaming) Dan Lee explained to USA Today,
the company was happy to lose money on the meals
because, “first you have to go though the casino to
get to the buffet. I defy anyone to get there without
spending at least that much on a slot machine.”62
Loss leaders had been a staple of the Las Vegas
Strip since the 1940s, yet Circus Circus was apply-
ing them to the grind business with brutal effi-
ciency—and prospering. The managing partners
opened a Reno casino in 1978, bought the next-door
slot mart Slots-A-Fun in 1979, and acquired the Sil-
ver City, a small casino across the Strip from Cir-
cus Circus, in 1981.63 These properties helped Cir-
cus Circus Enterprises become the Cinderella story
of early 1980s Las Vegas. While other casinos were
reeling from the recession in 1980, Circus Circus
turned an $7.9 million profit, a slight drop-off from
its 1979 haul of $8.1 million, but stellar compared
to others. After that, the sky was the limit: net in-
come edged up to $9.1 million in 1981, then jumped
to $15.8 million in 1982, $18.3 million in 1983, and
$23 million in 1984—a 23% average annual in-
SCHWARTZ270
TABLE 4. LAS VEGAS STRIP TABLE GAME MIX, 1983–1989
Year BJ Craps Roulette Baccarat Total Tables Total Positions
1983 988 140 83 41 1,287 7,722
1984 980 140 83 34 1,275 7,650
1985 1,019 142 88 32 1,316 7,896
1986 1,067 142 89 32 1,370 8,220
1987 1,072 152 97 42 1,418 8,508
1988 978 145 94 50 1,345 8,070
1989 1,139 161 112 43 1,575 9,450
Notes: Casinos with annual gross gaming revenue of more than $1,000,000 in previous year.
Wheel of fortune, pai gow, sic bo, and other table games not listed individually but are included in “Total Tables.” Keno,
bingo, race and sports book are not included.
Source: Nevada State Gaming Control Board Gaming Revenue Analysis, for final month or quarter in calendar year.
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crease over five years in a period when most casi-
nos were struggling to remain solvent.64 For the rest
of the decade, net income grew at even more im-
pressive levels; 1989 saw profits of $81.2 million,
a five-year compound growth rate of nearly 29%.65
It wasn’t a question of gambling, as it was one of
mass entertainment. Circus Circus touted itself as
an “entertainment merchant” whose model was the
mega-market or box store, an enormous retailer that
sold a variety of goods at bargain prices.66 “Basi-
cally, we are mass merchandisers,” Circus Circus
Enterprises chairman Bill Bennett declared in
1985.67 In contemplating a new development on the
south Strip that ultimately became the Excalibur, the
company in 1988 saw Circus Circus, only larger:
again, it would cater to “middle-income guests and
players,” and the new casino therefore would have
policies that resembled those at the company’s ex-
isting properties “with their traditional emphasis on
extraordinary value for the price.”68 The world’s
most profitable casino company believed that it had
found the winning formula, and it wasn’t going to
tamper with it.
Circus Circus prospered because, with its circus
acrobats and bargain prices, it was uniquely situated
to exploit a market segment that other casinos were
only now discovering: families. Driving in, eating
lunch at Burger King, and spending the day at the
newly-opened Wet N’ Wild water park, between the
Sahara and Riviera casinos, couples with kids found
themselves pursued in Las Vegas as never before.69
Five years before, they had only been welcome un-
der the pink and white big top of Circus Circus; now
they were courted everywhere. “For the first time,”
a 1985 USA Today article noted, “casinos along the
Strip are catering to Middle America, a giant class
of low rollers known as ‘grind players’ who bring
their families, stay a few days and spend $500—at
most.”70 By way of explanation, Glenn Schaeffer,
chief financial officer of Circus Circus, enunciated
what would become the city’s mantra for the next
decade: “Yes, Middle America is the largest and
most dependable segment of the gaming market.
And that market of high-rollers . . . is very finite.
There just aren’t a lot of people who can afford to
lose a lot of money.”71
Refocusing on Middle America proved to be the
road to Eldorado for Las Vegas casino operators.
Revenues began rising again in 1983 and maintained
their upward trajectory for the rest of the decade. In
1984, Clark County broke the $2 billion gaming rev-
enue threshold, and averaged a nearly 8% gain in
revenues, adjusted for inflation, from 1985 to 1990
(Table 1). When not adjusting for inflation, the num-
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TABLE 5. REVENUE FROM SLOTS VS. TABLES, 
DOWNTOWN LAS VEGAS, FISCAL 1980–1989
Year Pit Slots Other Bad Debts
1980 44.4% 52.2 3.4* 0.5%
1981 42.3% 53.0% 4.7% 0.5%
1982 40.0% 55.0% 5.0% 0.4%
1983 37.6% 57.6% 4.8% 0.6%
1984 37.9% 57.2% 4.9% 1.1%
1985 41.7% 54.0% 4.3% 0.8%
1986 38.1% 57.7% 4.2% 1.1%
1987 36.3% 58.9% 4.9% 0.5%
1988 35.1% 60.6% 4.3% 0.4%
1989 36.1% 60.0% 3.9% 0.6%
* In 1983 only, keno was included in the “Other” category.”
Notes: All casinos with gaming revenue of $1,000,000 and over.
“Pit” income includes keno and bingo. 
“Other” includes race book, sports pool, poker, and pan.
“Bad Debts” is the bad debt expense incurred by the casino department, represented as a per-
centage of total gaming revenue. 
Source: NEVADA GAMING ABSTRACTS
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bers are even more impressive: those five years had
an average revenue gain of more than 11%. Both
downtown and on the Strip, executives became con-
fident that, having found a new, dependable market,
the salad days of the early and mid-1970s were back.
Double-digit revenue increases became common, as
they had been until 1980 (Table 1).
On the Strip, revenue gains matched those for
Clark County, which was boosted by the continu-
ing success of downtown and the growth of Laugh-
lin, a bargain Vegas on the Colorado River. In 1985,
Strip casinos earned a total of $2.3 billion, about
$1.3 billion of that from gaming and the rest from
rooms, food, and entertainment. By 1989, that fig-
ure had increased to over $3.4 billion, with gaming
alone accounting for more than $2 billion.72 By
broadening its base, the Strip had effectively in-
creased its total revenue stream, with non-gaming
increases keeping pace with the rising gaming win.
In the mid-1980s, Strip operators did more than
just take advantage of the recovering national econ-
omy. They strategically repositioned themselves to
exploit a mass market of lower-value but higher vol-
ume players, recognizing that the international high-
rolling crowd of the 1970s wouldn’t be returning.
Those who filled the Strip’s coffers in 1984 and be-
yond weren’t, for the most part, foreign visitors
playing baccarat; they were middle-class Americans
playing slot machines. In this regard, the Strip
specifically borrowed from not only downtown Las
Vegas but even its Eastern nemesis Atlantic City:
the latter matured into a destination primarily for
day-tripping quarter slots players by the mid-1980s,
and the Strip, though it required a longer stay by ne-
cessity, had no problem chasing a similar caliber of
player.
The Burger King Revolution was, then, a re-
sounding success. The pessimism of just a few years
earlier dissipated like mist in the desert sun, and
casino executives again began thinking about ex-
pansion. As early as 1985, USA Today noted an
ironic reversal: now Atlantic City’s growth was
slowing, while Las Vegas’ was speeding up.73
Glenn Schaeffer could proclaim that, “Nevada and
Las Vegas are in the midst of an up cycle in casino
revenues. Gaming is growing again.”74
Casino revenues skyrocketed, in part, because the
casinos that embraced the new mass-marketing
strategy added thousands of rooms, letting them
welcome more players with smaller bankrolls. Cir-
cus Circus added the Skyrise tower, a 1,200-room
high-rise addition, in 1986.75 The Tropicana added
an 806-room tower as part of a $55 million facelift
in the same year. Ramada Inns gaming group pres-
ident Paul Rubeli, who oversaw the expansion, ex-
plicitly said that he was turning to the “middle-class,
the resort-oriented customer,” and was happy to see
the property’s high roller business drop from 50%
of its total revenue to 30%. The low end players, he
explained, had a profit margin of only ten cents on
the dollar, and high rollers were too risky and their
market too competitive. “But right in the middle,”
he argued, “is that husband and wife who spend
$500. With them, we’ll make 70 cents on the dol-
lar.”76 Several other casinos added room expan-
sions, as the city’s hotel room inventory rose from
50,270 in 1982 to 61,394 in 1988.77 This was the
total of three 1990s-style mega-resorts, and nearly
all of the rooms were geared away from high rollers
and towards middle-market, bargain-hunting cus-
tomers.
Casinos also built non-hotel additions that catered
even more directly to a modest-spending clientele.
Circus Circus added Circusland, a 421-space RV
park to its offerings in 1979. The Hacienda and Star-
dust later built similar, though smaller, on-site RV
parks.78 The following year, while Caesars Palace
was showing off its new, outrageously lavish Fan-
tasy Tower, Circus Circus added Circus Circus
Manor, an 810-room three-story self-contained mo-
tel that was later connected to the casino by a mono-
rail.79 Back in 1978 Circus executives had forecast
that Las Vegas needed RV hookups more than hot
tubs. Five years later, they were vindicated.
Success with Middle America bred, if not com-
placency, a certain restlessness. With the mass mar-
ket now taken for granted, those at the forefront of
the industry began thinking about new horizons. In
1989, operators added nearly 6,000 rooms to Las
Vegas, including the category-breaking Mirage
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casino resort, Steve Wynn’s answer to the grind
houses of the Strip. In downtown Las Vegas and At-
lantic City, New Jersey, Wynn had already found a
niche by building properties with the highest possi-
ble overhead. These, he insisted, would attract free-
spending high rollers and ultimately enjoy the high-
est profits in the market. He proved himself correct
twice, and looked to do it again on the Strip. 
The Mirage, which opened on November 22,
1989, was a rousing triumph. Each day, an estimated
25,000 people walked through its doors, whether to
simply gawk at the 40-foot-tall erupting volcano or
the dolphin habitat, see Siegfried and Roy perform
in a dedicated showroom, or to gamble. With just
as much attention given to the laying out of its
grounds (which included 2,500 palm trees) as its slot
banks, the Mirage was built with more than the gam-
bler in mind.80 It had non-gaming elements that had
never been seen in an American casino, and was de-
signed to earn just as much profit from the hotel,
restaurants, and entertainment as from the casino.
The customer, Wynn intuited, wanted quality, and
would gladly pay the cost. It was the Thermidorian
reaction to the Burger King Revolution.
The opening of the Mirage marked the end of the
1980s on the Strip, nine years almost to the day that
the gloomy decade symbolically began with the
tragic fire at the MGM Grand. Nov. 21, 1980 rep-
resented a loss of confidence in the plush, high-end
hotel on the Strip. Nov. 22, 1989 saw its rebirth.
Avidly chasing the baccarat trade, flying in inter-
national high rollers, and charging handsomely for
rooms, the Mirage broke all the lessons that had
been learned so painfully over the previous decade. 
Defying the conventional wisdom of Silver and
Bennett, the Mirage was a success, immediately be-
coming the city’s top revenue producer. Within two
years of its opening, Steve Wynn could boast that
he’d built “the most successful casino in the history
of Nevada.”81 By the end of the 1990s, a host of
new casinos that emulated the Mirage had been
built. Even Circus Circus Enterprises, under the
leadership of Glenn Schaeffer, sought to move be-
yond clowns and quarter slots; in 1999, the com-
pany opened Mandalay Bay, a massive luxury com-
plex containing a Four Seasons hotel which charged
the highest room rates on the Strip. Gone were the
days of $16 weeknights. Excalibur, built to the spec-
ifications of a flawless business model, had no em-
ulators. For the next twenty years, every new proj-
ect on the Strip attempted, in theory at least, to cater
to the high end.
Fittingly, Circus Circus Enterprises changed its
name to the Mandalay Resort Group to match its
new upscale pretensions. There is no better symbol
of the triumph of the Mirage and the final end of
the Burger King Revolution. By 2000, the tendency
of the 1980s for the Strip to converge with down-
town (more slots, less reliance on non-gaming
amenities) had been completely reversed. Slots
were still important, but gambling itself was be-
coming less of a draw. In 1999, for the first time,
Strip casinos garnered less than half of their total
revenues from their gambling floors.82 Luxury 
and convention travelers spending heavily on
rooms, shows, and dining had displaced bargain-
hunting, RV-driving families as the Strip’s most
coveted customers. Las Vegas was in the midst of
a high-stakes counter-revolution, one that would be
hailed as both brilliant and inevitable—until the
sustained downturn of 2008 and beyond shattered
confidence in the casino industry’s appeal to luxe—
yet again.
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